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Abstract
Are asymmetric shocks to output less important for industries which are more
open to trade and more technology-intensive? Our results, obtained from a
correlation analysis between growth rates of value added in thirteen
manufacturing industries in eleven European countries between 1979 and 1990,
clearly support the hypothesis.
This finding suggests that policies which promote trade and technological
innovation may help to decrease the importance of the asymmetric components
of the business cycle within European countries.
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Many recent analyses of the benefits and costs of joining EMU have focused on the
importance of asymmetries in the business cycle among potential members of the union. Many
researchers have found these asymmetries to be quite relevant for the EU as a whole. In our
view, however, the implications of these results have sometimes been over-emphasized. While
business cycle asymmetries are clearly a negative entry in the balance of benefits and costs
resulting from the participation to EMU, it should also be clear that they can be taken care of,
for instance by an appropriate design of fiscal policy or by incentives to increase factor
mobility within the union. Furthermore, what has been often neglected is that such
asymmetries are not exogenous to the institutional context of the economy, and that they are
likely to be influenced by the decision of European countries to participate in the EU and in
EMU. In this paper we inquire in particular whether an increased openness to trade within
European industries (which is the predicted outcome of the establishment of one market and
of the adoption of a single currency)  and a higher degree of technological intensity are
correlated with a reduced importance of business cycle asymmetries.
For this purpose, we estimate and interpret a statistical model of the evolution of, and
correlation between, growth rates of value added of thirteen manufacturing industries in
eleven European countries, between 1979 and 1990. We document to what extent growth
rates in each “local industry” are correlated at the country or at the industry level, and
whether the relative importance of these correlations is related to some specific characteristics
of each local industry - and in particular to the importance of international trade and to the
degree of technological intensity.
To motivate intuitively our line of research consider, as an example, two industries in
the same country, the first one of which sells in foreign countries a higher share of its output.
Is the growth rate of output in the first industry likely to be relatively less correlated with
growth rates in other industries in the same country? Many economists would probably agree
that, ceteris paribus, this is likely to be so: the first industry, probably, is relatively more
exposed to the international business cycle, and less exposed to the domestic component ofthe business cycle
1. But then, as barriers to trade in the second industry are reduced, the
degree of asymmetry will  also be reduced. In this view, contrary to the analysis à la Mundell
(1961), the existence of symmetry between countries is no longer a prerequisite, but will
instead become the outcome of a process of full economic integration.
The paper is organized in the following way. In section 2 we review the literature and,
in section 3, we discuss the hypotheses to be tested. In section 4 we briefly describe the data
and evaluate the results of the analysis. Section 5 concludes.
2. The evidence on asymmetric shocks, and their relevance to EMU
In this section we briefly review and discuss the literature on two related issues. First,
we evaluate the evidence documenting the relevance of asymmetries in the business cycles of
different countries. Second, we discuss to what extent this evidence has implications for the
desirability of monetary unification.
2.1 Review of the literature
Typically, the literature on international real business cycles finds that country-specific
sources of variation dominate over industry-specific sources.  This points to the prevailing of
asymmetric cyclical fluctuations. See Backus, Kehoe and Kidland (1992) and Costello
(1993). Other papers look at the correlation properties of stock market returns, and they also
find that returns are more strongly correlated along the country rather than the industry
dimension. See Drummen and Zimmerman (1992) and Heston and Rouwenhorst (1994).
Parallel to this, another literature has been developing in the recent years. Its main
concern is to assess the relevance of business cycle asymmetries, viewed as an obstacle to the
establishment of a currency area within a group of countries. Most of this literature is related
to the debate on EMU. The starting point has been the paper by Bayoumi and Eichengreen
(1993). They found that, identifying Germany as the anchor area , four other countries join
Germany in the core of the EU: Belgium, Denmark, France and Netherlands. This core is
defined by a high correlation of supply shocks, and to a lesser extent also of demand shocks,
within this group of countries. In a similar vein, Bini Smaghi and Vori (1993), using
                                               
1 The answer to this question would probably be the same, whether the international business
cycle is mainly driven by innovations on the demand or on the supply side.disaggregate data, find that for the six founding members of the EC, 60% of the explained
variance of manufacturing output is explained by sector-specific shocks alone. For 10 EC
countries, this percentage is 23% (for 1976-1990). This again points to the existence of a
core of countries with a considerable degree of symmetry.
Using a different empirical model, Helg, Manasse, Monacelli and Rovelli (1995;
henceforth HMMR) found that, for all EU countries, within-country correlations of output
growth dominate over within-industry correlations. Similarly, after modeling output
innovations as residuals from a cointegrated VAR, they used principal components analysis to
show that more variance of output innovations is explained at the country, rather than the
industry level. This points to a potentially high level of asymmetry. However, they also found
that, within a subset of the EU countries, country principal components are strongly
correlated with each other. On this basis, they identify a core of “symmetric” countries, which
include in the inner layer Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands, followed by Denmark and
France.
Whereas the papers referred to above examine data for the manufacturing sectors only,
Bayoumi and Prasad (1995) define 8 sectors, which add up - in terms of valued added - to
GDP. They also distinguish between long and short run disturbances. They found that in the
long run (average growth rates) region-specific disturbances are dominant in Europe,
negligible in the US 
2. From the point of view of the business cycle, they also found that
short-term fluctuations in Europe tend to be in general more “idiosyncratic”. In the
Manufacturing, Transport and Trade sectors, in particular, regional shocks (even if they
explain less variance than sectoral shocks) are in relative terms considerably more important
than in the US, as they account for 20-28% of total variance.
Thus the literature on EMU points to the fact that, as far as output or value added is
concerned, there is a core of countries with a higher degree of symmetry (country-specific
innovations are of relatively low importance), but that if we extend the analysis to include all
                                               
2  Significantly, however, region-specific disturbances are not important in Europe as far as
employment growth is concerned. In another paper which looks primarily at the determinants of
employment, Marimon and Zilibotti (1996) also find that almost 80% of the long-run employment
growth differentials across EU countries and industries is accounted by sectoral effects, and only 20%
by country effects. However, the latter figure rises to 47% over the business cycle frequency. Thus, it
seems that the determinants of output and of employment shocks may be of  different origin. Although
it would be interesting to examine in some detail and possibly explain this difference, this is not the
purpose of this paper.the countries in the EU (during the Eighties, eleven countries) then country or idiosyncratic
factors gain importance.
2.2 Is asymmetry an obstacle to monetary unification?
 In general, the evidence which we have reviewed shows the importance of country factors (at
least outside a core of EU countries): that is, of shocks which are not positively correlated,
and thus asymmetric, between countries. What are the implications of this finding for the
debate on monetary unification? The existence of asymmetric shocks between countries,
which are about to enter a process of monetary unification, is clearly a potential source of
costs and frictions alongside that process. However, there are at least three reasons why we
should not overstate the significance of these findings:
• In a Mundellian world (with only two completely specialized countries, and elastic
aggregate supply (or equivalently, with exploitable Phillips curve tradeoffs), exchange rate
policy is an appropriate therapy against asymmetric shocks: if a positive shock in Germany
affects France negatively, and Germany won’t react to it, France might want to devalue. But
in a world of many countries it is unclear whether the exchange rate is such a good policy
instrument: as France devalues vis à vis Germany, it will at the same time affect the exchange
rate towards all the other countries in the world, which might otherwise be undesirable (See
Melitz, 1994).
3
• Similarly, in a world of two, incompletely specialized countries, or with different
regions within each country, it is not clear whether an “asymmetric” shock (between the two
countries) is also “symmetric” inside one country. That is, because industries are not
homogeneously located within a country, different regions might be affected differently by the
shock. If this is the case (that is, if an existing country is not an optimal currency area), then it
is not necessarily true that either country will want to use the exchange rate as a policy
instrument against that shock (See Bofinger, 1994, and Melitz, 1994).
At a different level of analysis, if policy makers within a group of “asymmetric”
countries are able and willing to commit to long run policy choices, they will weight the short
                                                                                                                                                
3  Bayoumi and Eichengreen (1997) analyze the determinants of bilateral nominal exchange rate
variability within a group of 21, mostly European, countries. They find differences in growth rates to
be an important explanatory variable, whereas the size of bilateral exports is negatively related to
exchange rate variability.run benefits of using the exchange rate as a tool of stabilization policy against the long run
benefits of committing to exchange rate (and possibly, monetary) stability and (if the
conclusions of this paper are correct) the may also anticipate that, as exchange rate stability
fosters trade and economic integration between countries, the cyclical behavior of industrial
sectors will become more positively correlated among those countries. This implication has
been examined in particular by Frankel and Rose (1996). In a paper which is motivated by the
same considerations discussed in this paper,  they examine bilateral trade and real activity data
for 21 countries and find that “closer international trade links result in more closely correlated
business cycles across countries.” (p.2)
The  purpose of this paper is thus to examine the validity of the last argument
mentioned above. For instance,  we shall document to what extent the magnitude of
asymmetries is lower in more open industries.  If this is so, then this would establish a prima
facie argument in favor of asymmetries being endogenous to the process of trade integration.
These issues will be more thoroughly discussed in the following section.
3. Trade, innovation and asymmetry
In this section we discuss how the extent to which one country is exposed to output
shocks of an (a)symmetric nature (relatively to other countries) may be influenced by
economic variables such as the degree of trade openness and of technological intensity.  To
start with, we need to give a more precise definition of symmetry. We define “symmetric” a
situation where the role of domestic factors (demand and supply conditions in other
industries; level and composition of final demand; labor market conditions) in explaining the
cyclical behavior of an industry or a sector does not dominate (or is low) relatively to the role
attributable to international factors. This implies that business cycles should be
contemporaneously correlated across countries. We define “asymmetric” the opposite
situation, in which “country” variables matter considerably.
3.1 The role of trade openness
Assume an economy which, initially, is closed to trade (of goods, services and know
how). It is then natural to assume that demand or supply shocks will be independently
distributed of, and thus asymmetric to, those affecting other countries. As this economy
begins to trade with other countries, then demand shocks affecting those countries mightaffect exporting industries. As different industries in different countries use the same imported
inputs (say, oil), then supply shocks in the oil industry will affect all those industries world
wide which use that input. These effects introduce elements of symmetry.  This introduces the
first conjecture.
Conjecture 1. For a given technology, sectors which are more open are more likely to be
affected by demand and supply shocks which are symmetric across countries.
It is useful in this context to clarify our notion of openness. First, notice that available
data measure, for each manufacturing industry, exports and imports of both intermediate and
final goods. Thus, for instance, imports include both intermediate goods used within the same
industry but purchased abroad and also goods sold for final purchase, and possibly
competitive, to some extent, with domestic production. From modern approaches to
international trade we know that, if industry structure is imperfectly competitive, this will lead
to intra-industry trade and the pattern of specialization will also be more similar across
countries. Other approaches emphasize instead the tendency of trade to produce (at the limit,
complete) specialization. This is so both in the more traditional approach, based on
comparative advantages, and in the more recent literature, based on agglomeration economies
(Krugman, 1991). It would seem plausible to assume that more symmetry should follow as
long as more intra-industry trade develops. In general, empirical trade literature agrees on the
fact that intra-industry trade has indeed been a characteristic feature of international trade in
the postwar period. This confirms the plausibility of the hypothesis that more trade should
produce more symmetry. In the next section we further examine the relationship between
intra industry-trade and business cycle symmetry.
3.2  Intra-industry trade and business cycles symmetry
To understand more clearly the relationship between openness and symmetry, consider
the following examples. Assume that local industry A1 (industry 1 in country A) sells its
output in equal shares in countries A, B, C. However, local industries B1 and C1 only
produce for the domestic market. The discussion in section 3.1 suggests that we should relate
symmetry to trade openness. But in the context of this example the relationship between
symmetry and trade openness is not an obvious one. By construction, the sales of industry A1
will not be more correlated to the evolution of (say) aggregate demand in A than in B or C;
thus, according to our definition of symmetry as reduced influence of domestic factors,
industry A1 is subject to symmetric shocks, while industries B1 and C1 are not (since they areonly influenced by local demand conditions). But all three industries are, by definition, open.
It might seem more plausible to argue that, if trade is unidirectional (in either direction), it
does not necessarily make an industry more symmetric (industry A1 trades and is symmetric;
industry B1 trades and is not symmetric). Thus, Conjecture 1 must be taken to imply that
trade openness of a particular local industry is a necessary, but need not be a sufficient
requisite for symmetry.
The example above might also be taken to imply that exports, more than trade
openness, are a relevant indicator of symmetry. However, this conclusion (although it is
confirmed by our particular example) is not necessarily true. Consider the following example.
Industry A1 is as before, and industries B1 and C1 again produce  for the domestic market
only, but using imported input from A1. In this case, and to the extent that a technological
shock hits A1's exports of intermediate products to the other countries, then we might
observe a symmetric (and also industry-wide) shock. In this example, symmetry  is related not
so much to exports vs. imports, but to the fact that, even if unidirectional, trade is of the
intra-industry rather than of the inter-industry type. While this is probably a better way to
characterize our conjecture, unfortunately in our data we cannot distinguish between inter and
intra industry trade. Despite this limitation, we think it may nevertheless be interesting to
characterize empirically to what extent the relevance of country and/or of industry-wide
variables is associated with the degree of industry openness.
4
3.3 Country versus industry factors
Until now, we have defined symmetry as implying a reduced role played by country
factors (once factors affecting the international business cycle are taken into account). But
should we also define as more symmetric a situation where each local industry is more
strongly correlated, across the business cycle, with the corresponding local industries in other
countries? It may be tempting to answer positively, and to some extent this has been the
accepted answer in the literature. See Stockman (1988) and HMMR. For instance, the latter
argue: "industry-wide shocks may naturally spread across countries, hence they embody an
element of symmetry" (p.1030). We agree with this notion, but we also note that it is not
equivalent to a "necessary" condition for symmetry. To understand, let us consider a
                                               
4  Our conjecture is also supported, at the aggregate level, by the recent findings of  Frankel and
Rose (1996). Using thirty years of aggregate data for industrialized countries, they find that countriescounterexample. Assume, as before, that local industry A1 (industry 1 in country A) sells its
output in equal shares in countries A, B, C, and that local industries B1 and C1 only produce
for the domestic market. As we discussed above, industry A1 is, and industries B1 and C1 are
not, subject to symmetric shocks. Thus, in general it will not be the case that symmetry of
industry A1 implies that it should be correlated to the cyclical behavior of industry 1 in the
other countries (since each of those is by hypothesis only influenced by its own domestic
market). Thus, there is no reason why we should see industry-wide shocks  naturally
spreading across countries. Only to the extent that industries A1, B1 and C1 are all
symmetric, then symmetry will also imply that they are subject to industry wide shocks. Thus
we shall seek an answer to the following question, although we do not have a priori
arguments in favor of either a positive or a negative answer:
Question 1:  Is a reduced role of country factors (a signal of  more symmetry) associated
with an increased role of industry factors?
3.4 The role of technology
As countries compete in the international market, there will be pressure in each industry
to adopt the best technologies around, and to search for better ones. In open economies, the
same industry will tend to adopt the same technology in different countries or locations, and
thus will be exposed to the same technological shocks (Stockman, 1988). Thus, a compelling
question concerns the role of technology, and of the way it is disseminated across countries
and industries, with respect to the correlation of business cycles. To the extent that the same
technology is adopted everywhere, then technology shocks will be a source of symmetry. This
reinforces our first conjecture. A further question however is whether this symmetry-inducing
role of technology is related to the degree of technological development of an industry, or to
the speed of the process of technological innovation (as measured, for instance, by the
amount of resources spent for R&D).  The answer to this question, however, would seem to
require a more detailed analysis of the process of technology adoption, which we cannot
accomplish on the basis of our data set. Thus we shall not venture into specific conjectures on
the relationship between the amount of resources spent for R&D and the extent of symmetry.
Nevertheless, we shall examine this issue empirically:
                                                                                                                                                
with closer trade links (measured as the intensity of bilateral trade) tend to have more tightly correlated
business cycles.Question 2: Do industries with a higher volume of technology expenditures (measured, e.g.,
by the ratio of R&D expenditure to value added) have a higher degree of symmetry
(measured by a reduced role of country factors)?
Moreover, as Coe and Helpman (1995) have suggested, there is in this context one
specific proposition that reinforces, a priori, our first conjecture. Factor productivity in one
industry is likely to be affected not only by foreign as well as by domestic technology (R&D)
expenditure, and the more so the more open to trade is the industry. This observation
suggests that:
Conjecture 2. Industries which are more open to trade are more likely to be affected by
technology shocks of a symmetric nature across countries.
3.5 Summing up
In this section, we have come to the conclusion that the degree of openness (in
particular, to intra-industry trade) should affect positively the exposure to symmetric shocks
(conjecture 1) and, in particular, to symmetric technology shocks (conjecture 2). Also, we
have observed that the notion of symmetry is inversely related to the importance of country
factors, whereas we have no a priori on whether empirically a reduced role of country factors
should also be associated with an increased role of industry factors (question 1). Only to the
extent that all local industries in a world-wide industry are symmetric, then industry-wide
factors will become dominant. Finally, we have suggested that it would be interesting to
explore if there is an empirical relationship between the rate of technology-related (R&D)
expenditures and the degree of symmetry (question 2). In the next section we shall discuss
how to explore these questions in our data set, and evaluate the results of the empirical
analysis.
4. Evidence
For the empirical analysis we use a set of data assembled for the purpose of this study.
The data base includes complete annual series for value added, R&D expenditures, imports
and exports, for 13 manufacturing industries and 11 European countries over the period
1979-1990. Different data sources have been made comparable. See Tables A.0 and A.1 in
the Appendix for details.We shall first examine the pattern of correlations between growth rates of value added
of the 143 “local industries” in our sample (Section 4.1). Then (section 4.2) we analyze how
these correlations vary when we split our sample according to the conjectures put forward in
the previous section. Finally (section 4.3) we estimate a statistical model of the growth rate of
value added,  and again we split the sample to see whether the results are affected by
variables like the degree of openness and technological intensity.
4.1  Country and industry correlations
The first descriptive measure of the degree of symmetry, or asymmetry, is the correlation of
growth rates of value added, across industries and countries 
5. In our context, the definitions
of different correlation measures are somewhat tricky, and may become the source of some
confusion: to avoid this, we describe them in some detail. Taking the “local industry” (one
manufacturing industry in one country) as the point of departure, we define the country
correlation for each local industry as the average correlation with the growth rates of value
added of all the other local industries in the same country.  Similarly, we define the industry
correlation for each local industry as the average correlation with the growth rates of value
added of all the same industries in the other countries. This information is reported in Tables
A.2 and A.3 respectively.
To synthesize this information, we consider (as in HMMR) for each country the
average of all its industries’ country correlations (the last row of Table A.2) and the average
of all its industries’ industry correlations (the last row of Table A.3). For each country, these
data are also plotted on the horizontal and vertical axis of Figure 1.a, respectively. We notice
that for all countries (except the Netherlands) the average of country correlations is larger
than the average of industry correlations. From the figure we also note that peripheric and
small countries lie closer to the origin. In general these findings confirm those of HMMR.
[Insert Figures 1.a and  1.b  here]
We have followed an analogous procedure for each industry in the sample, using the last
columns of Tables A.2 and A.3. That is, taking as the starting point the set of country
                                               
5 With annual data, and relatively short time series, it is not feasible to obtain more precise measures
of business cycle correlation. For this reason, almost all the papers in the literature following
Stockman (1988) have considered correlations of growth rates. Moreover, HMMR report that the
pattern of quarterly growth rate correlations of industrial production (for the same group of countriescorrelations of each local industry (Table A.2), we take industry averages for each  industry
(the last column of the Table) and also, taking as starting point the set of industry correlations
of each local industry (Table A.3), we take industry averages for each industry (the last
column of the Table). For each industry, these data are also plotted on the horizontal and
vertical axis of Figure 1.b, respectively. The relationship between each industry’s average
country and industry correlations is similar in Figure 1.b to that of Figure 1.a: for all
industries, (with the exception of Office and Precision Instruments) the average of their
country correlations is larger than the average of their industry correlations.
We may conclude this first look at the data by suggesting that, on the basis of both
figures, most manufacturing industries in our sample have higher growth rates correlations
within their country of location rather than with their industrial homologues in other
countries. We now turn to examine how these data might change across different subsamples,
on the basis of the questions and conjectures raised in Section 3.
4.2  The patterns of country correlations across subsamples
As a preliminary step to this analysis we need to find appropriate ways of dividing our
sample according to the characteristics of the local industries on which we are focusing. We
have defined the following sample splits.
• Split 1 (according to trade openness - 4 equal sized groups)
6
• Split 2.A (according to technological intensity measured for each local industry - 4
groups)
• Split 2.B (according to technological intensity measured at the EU level for each
industry):
I. low (with R&D/VA below 1%): food, textiles, wood, paper
II. middle (between 1 and 3%): rubber, mineral products, basic metal industries, metal
products, non-electrical machinery
III. high (above 6%): chemicals, electrical machinery, transport equipment, office and
precision instruments
• Split 3 (according to country characteristics  selected with cluster analysis - See Table 1)
                                                                                                                                                
as here) is quite similar to that obtained from business cycle innovations measured on the basis of a
VAR model.
6 As described in Table A.0, we measure trade openness with respect to total exports and imports.
Results do not change if we consider only within-Europe trade.• Split 4 (according to  industry characteristics selected with cluster analysis - See Table 2).
The last two splits are based on a cluster analysis that allow us to identify homogeneous
groups of observations on the basis of characteristics defined at the country or the industry
level.
[Insert Tables 1 and 2 here]
We now examine how the patterns of correlations at the country level change when we
split the sample according to the criteria defined above. We expect that country correlations
should be less pronounced for the group of local industries characterized by a higher degree
of trade openness. Moreover we want to assess if a higher degree of technological intensity is
related to a lower degree of asymmetry. For each of the 5 splits we have averaged within
country correlations of growth rates of value added (from Table A.2) and also within industry
correlations of growth rates of value added (from Table A.3). Results are reported in the last
two columns of Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 here]
4.2.1 Within-country correlations
We comment first on within country correlations. The results of the first splits show that
indeed the degree of asymmetry (the country average correlations) tends to decrease with
openness (Split 1) and with technological intensity (Split 2.A and 2.B). This pattern is more
evident for trade openness, as in this case our measure of asymmetry decreases from 0.36 for
the group of the less open industries (TOP.1) to 0.24 for the most open group (TOP.4). Also
the high-tech sectors in split 2.B show a lower country correlation (0.22 compared to 0.33-
0.32 for the low and medium tech industries).
As for the groupings based on cluster analysis, in Split 3, as it might be intuitively
expected, within-country correlations are larger for the larger countries (0.38 versus 0.24 for
the other two groups) These large countries have in  common a much lower degree of
openness (even if they also share a higher technological intensity). From Split 4 we find that
the lowest degree of asymmetry is in cluster 2, which is characterized by very high trade
openness and high technological intensity.
Summing up, the examination of the patterns of within country growth rate correlations
point to the fact that these correlations are lower,  the larger are the degrees of openness andof technological intensity (Split 1, 2.A, 2.B, 4). They are instead larger for the larger
countries.
4.2.2 Within-industry correlations
Considering within-industry correlations (the last column of Table 3), the pattern of
their changes across sub-samples is less clear. The range of variation is in general quite
small, and there is no systematic change associated with changes in either trade openness or
technological intensity.
4.3 Country versus industry effects in growth rates regressions
The second procedure we follow to test our conjectures is based on the estimation of a
statistical model. We performed regressions of the growth rates of value added on a set of
dummies, representing respectively pure time effects (TIME), time-varying country effects
(COUNTRY) common for all industries in a country, and time-varying industry effects
(INDUSTRY) common for all countries to which each industry belongs
7. We expect that the
contribution of the COUNTRY dummies (measuring the importance of asymmetric components
in the business cycle) should decrease (or, in the limit, become not significant) when we
restrict the sample to the more open industries. We do not have specific expectations towards
the results from the sample restricted to the more high-tech industries (although, to be
consistent with the findings of section 4.1, we should find that also in this case the COUNTRY
dummies play a reduced role).  For this experiment, we have run 48 regressions, using as
dependent variable the annual growth rate of value added for each local industry
8. The
dependent variable has been defined on the basis of the sample splits discussed in section 4.1
9.
Including the whole sample, we have thus 16 vectors of growth rates. Each vector has then
been regressed on three different sets of dummies: only TIME; TIME and COUNTRY; TIME,
COUNTRY and INDUSTRY. Adjusted R
2 statistics for the regressions done on the different
subsamples and with different subsets of regressors are reported in Table 4. The last column
reports the F-test for the exclusion of the COUNTRY dummies only.
                                               
7 This methodology is derived from that of Stockman (1988), also used in the context of the
literature on European “asymmetries” by Bini Smaghi and Vori (1995), Bayoumi and Prasad (1995)
and, with some modifications, Marimon and Zilibotti (1996).
8  Following Marimon and Zilibotti (1996) we have normalized each dependent variable by its
within sample standard deviation.
9  We do not consider split 3, as the resulting subsamples are already divided across countries.Examining the results in some detail, the first row in Table 4 reports the explained
variance of growth rates of value added in the whole sample (1573 observations over the
years 1980-1990). The R
2 is 0.27 when only the COUNTRY and TIME dummies are included,
0.35 when also the INDUSTRY dummies are added. On the basis of the argument above, we
expect that the variance attributed to COUNTRY effects should increase for the less open, and
less technological intensive local industries, and decrease for the more open and more
technological intensive local industries.
[Insert Table 4 here]
SPLIT 1. (Ranking of all local industries according to trade openness). The R
2 obtained from
inclusion of COUNTRY and TIME effects only decreases as we move to the more open group of
industries. In the fourth group, the exclusion of the COUNTRY effects (when the TIME and
INDUSTRY effect are included) cannot be statistically rejected at the 1% significance level.
SPLIT 2.A. (Ranking of all local industries according to technological intensity). Regressions in
the four groups show that  R
2 due to COUNTRY effects decreases from the first two (less
technological intensive) to the second two groups (although in the fourth it is higher than in
the third).
SPLIT 2.B. (Ranking of Euro-wide industries according to technological intensity). The R
2
explained by COUNTRY effects decreases systematically from the low to the high TEC
industries.
SPLIT 4. (Sample split on the basis of the four clusters defined in Table 2). We observe the
lowest R
2 for CLUSTER 2 (characterized by high openness) and also CLUSTER 4 (characterized
by high technological intensity). And again in these two sub-samples (and only in these) the
COUNTRY dummies are not statistically significant.
Summing up, with the partial exception of Split 2.A, all the results confirm that the
COUNTRY effects are much less relevant in the more open and technologically advanced
industries.
We have also examined the regression looking for separate effects of the industry
dummies and testing for their exclusion. As for the correlation analysis of section 4.1, there is
no systematic change in the effect of the dummies across subsamples, and the exclusion of
these dummies is generally accepted (data not reported, available on request).
4.4 Summing up the empirical findings1.  In reference to the questions and conjectures raised in section 3, we have found
the following answers.
• The extent to which growth rates in manufacturing industries in Europe are characterized
by country-specific (asymmetric) effects is inversely related to the level of trade openness.
This may be due to intra-industry trade spreading shocks across countries (conjecture 1),
and also to technology innovations being “imported” through trade (conjecture 2).
• A reduced role of country-specific factors is not in general associated with an increased
role of industry factors, as measured by either the correlation or the regression analysis.
So the short answer to question 1 is: no.
• Industries with a higher volume of R&D expenditures exhibit a higher degree of
symmetric behavior. So the answer to question 2 is affirmative.
2. 5. Conclusions and policy implications
In this paper we have shown that the importance of country effects on growth rates in
the manufacturing industry is inversely related to the levels of trade openness and of
technological intensity.  Is there any policy relevant implication of these findings? In the
literature on currency areas, the fact that a group of countries is exposed to asymmetric,
country-specific business cycle disturbances is considered as an obstacle to the adoption of a
common currency (or to fixing the exchange rate). While this is (not the only factor to be
taken into account, but) certainly correct in a static framework, the existence of some
asymmetries may be related to a lack sufficient integration within those countries, and thus
the decision to establish a currency area (or a monetary union) may validate itself in the
process of time, as increasing integration, fostered by the union, will eventually lead to a more
harmonized cyclical behavior across the participating countries.
In the empirical analysis we have identified two factors that may act as a vehicle of
further integration between countries: trade and technology. Thus, we should expect to find a
more symmetric behavior (across different countries) for those “local industries” which are
more open to trade and which require greater expenditures in technology. Since both factors -
trade and technology diffusion within a group of countries - are likely to be strengthened as
transactions costs are reduced and factor mobility is increased, as would be the case in a full
monetary union, the broad policy implications of our findings are clear. However, a word of
caution is required in at least four respects, which would also warrant an extension of ourresearch perspective. (i) First, our analysis has not shed any light on the time-scale of the
process of integration fostered by the growth of trade and the diffusion of technology. The
longer is this process, the greater may be the short-run costs of a monetary union. (ii) Second,
while our findings support the notion that such a monetary union might be beneficial in
reducing business cycle asymmetries, would we obtain the same results if we had used as a
starting point for the empirical analysis regions rather than local industries? Also, would the
same conclusions also apply had we considered a more heterogeneous group of countries (in
terms of their initial level of industrial development)? Or what alternative policies and
solutions might instead be adopted in such cases?  Clearly our analysis does not shed any light
in this respect. (iii) Third, it would be desirable to know and understand more about the
industry dynamics which lead to greater integration through trade, growth and technology
diffusion. For instance, are multinational companies better at promoting integration? And
which other policies, if any, should be activated to complement the adoption of a monetary
union at the macro level? (iv) Fourth, to what extent would we have reached the same
conclusions, if we had extended our analysis to other branches of economic activity besides
the manufacturing industries? As the contribution of manufacturing to the generation of value
added is generally decreasing in developed economies, this question is clearly an important
one. However, our ability to explore these issues is constrained by an unavoidable trade-off
between searching for (a)symmetries at a sufficient level of disaggregation, and taking into
account the whole spectrum of economic activity in each country. We suspect that, if we took
a more aggregate perspective, reducing the disaggregation in manufacturing to include other
broad sectors (other industries, agriculture and services), then the relative weight of country
versus sector effects would be increased. But this may be the subject of future research.
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0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
country



















0.0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7
country
Notes: Data on the horizontal and vertical axis of Figure 1A (1B) come from the
last rows (columns) of  Tables A.2 and A.3 respectively. See text for details.Table 1 Cluster analysis of countries  (Split 3, 1979-90)
Cluster Members Main characteristics Cluster Centers  (normalized var.)
label TOP TEC BAL DTOP DTEC DBAL
SMALL
COUNTRIES
BE, DK, IR, NL Small, open, low tech 1.12 -0.53 0.03 -0.50 -0.52 -0.80
LARGE
COUNTRIES
DE, FR, IT, UK Large, closed, high tech -0.85 0.71 0.53 -0.48 -0.46 1.12
SOUTHERN
COUNTRIES
ES, GR, PO Southern, with increasing
openness and  tech
-0.35 -0.24 -0.75 1.31 1.31 -0.43
Table 2 Cluster analysis of local industries    (Split 4, 1979-90)
Cluster Number Main characteristics
Cluster Centers
(normalized var.)
label of cases TOP TEC BAL
CLU-1 55 Low openness, deficit -0.30 -0.34 -0.74
CLU-2 13 Very high openness, high deficit, high tech 1.80 -0.07 -1.17
CLU-3 53 Very low openness, high surplus -0.85 -0.31 0.90
CLU-4 22 Very high technological intensity, openness -0.35 2.354 0.22
Notes to Tables 1 and 2:  Clustering method: Mean linkage between groups. See Table A.0
for the definition of the variables.Table 3
Growth rate correlations in selected sub-samples
Within Country Within Industry
Whole sample 0.29 0.16
TOP 1 (low) 0.36 0.18
Split 1 TOP 2 0.32 0.16
Trade openness TOP 3 0.28 0.16
TOP 4 (high) 0.24 0.16
Split 2.A TEC 1 (low) 0.35 0.21
Industry-level TEC 2 0.33 0.14
technological TEC 3 0.25 0.11
intensity TEC 4 (high) 0.27 0.18
Split 2.B EURO-TEC 1 (low)









   IND.  5,11,12,13
0.22 n.a.
Split 3 SMALL 0.24 n.a
Countries LARGE 0.38 n.a.
SOUTHERN 0.24 n.a.
Split 4 CLUSTER-1 0.30 0.14
Local industry CLUSTER-2 0.19 0.14
characteristics CLUSTER-3 0.29 0.17
CLUSTER-4 0.30 0.19
Notes. See text and  Table A.0 in the Appendix.Table 4
Regressions with Time, Country and Industry Effects











All 1573 .100 .270 .345 R
TOP 1 (low) 398 .142 .341 .426 R
Split 1 TOP 2 396 .109 .348 .337 R
TOP 3 396 .109 .233 .435 R
TOP 4 (high) 385 .062 .173 .184 A
TEC 1 (low) 396 .109 .347 .413 R
Split 2.A TEC 2 396 .109 .313 .409 R
TEC 3 396 .076 .161 .292 (A)
TEC 4 (high) 385 .154 .294 .357 R
EURO-TEC 1 (low)
     IND.    1,2,3,4
484 .100 .358 .473 R
Split 2.B EURO-TEC 2
     IND.  6,7,8,9,10
605 .174 .328 .378 R
EURO-TEC 3 (high)
    IND.  5,11,12,13
484 .054 .184 .251 R
CLUSTER-1 605 .078 .287 .375 R
Split 4 CLUSTER-2 143 .067  n.s.  n.s. A
CLUSTER-3 583 .137 .303 .347 R
CLUSTER-4 242 .145 .250 .275 A
Notes:  For the definition of the samples, see text and Table A.0 in the Appendix.
The dependent variable is the growth rate of value added (GVA) divided by the standard deviation (in
the time dimension) of GVA of local industry. Annual data, 1980-1990.
All the dummies are time-indexed.
The F-tests evaluate the exclusion of the COUNTRY dummies: R = reject exclusion at 1% level of




BE Belgium (trade includes Luxembourg) 1 Food, Beverages, Tobacco
DE Germany (Federal Republic) 2 Textiles, Apparel, Leather
DK Denmark 3 Wood Products, Furniture
ES Spain 4 Paper, Paper Products, Printing
FR France 5 Chemicals
GR Greece 6 Rubber and Plastic
IR Ireland 7 Non-Metallic Mineral Products
IT Italy 8 Basic Metal Industries
NL Netherlands 9 Metal Products
PO Portugal 10 Non-Electrical Machinery
UK United Kingdom 11 Electrical Machinery
12 Transport Equipment
13 Office and Precision Instruments
VARIABLES
LABEL DEFINITION PERIOD SOURCE
RD business enterprise expenditure
in research and development
1981-90 Ocse: Science and Technology
 Indicators  (Stan)
VA value added 1979-90 Ocse: Stan; Industrial Stat.; Eurostat
X total exports (Europe and RoW) 1979-90 Volimex
















GVA average % growth rate of value added,
1985 constant prices,  sectoral deflator
average
Table A.1Averages by Country and by Industry
for the variables in the data set (1979-90)
Country GVA TOP TEC BAL
BE Belgium 0.12 4.96 4.66 -0.01
DE Germany F.R. 0.94 1.27 3.82 0.05
DK Denmark 1.30 3.43 3.77 -0.10
ES Spain 0.00 1.19 1.70 0.01
FR France 1.03 1.32 5.14 -0.03
GR Greece 0.90 3.29 0.72 -0.47
IR Ireland 3.46 3.93 1.29 -0.15
IT Italy 3.20 1.19 2.87 0.09
NL Netherlands 1.46 4.37 2.02 -0.09
PO Portugal 2.30 2.68 0.60 -0.13
UK United Kingdom 1.69 1.71 5.65 -0.14
Industry GVA TOP TEC BAL
1 Food 1.88 1.42 0.65 0.05
2 Textiles, Apparel -0.83 2.81 0.45 0.03
3 Wood, Furniture 0.11 1.46 0.26 -0.16
4 Paper, Printing 2.14 1.07 0.28 -0.23
5 Chemicals 2.83 2.28 6.18 -0.08
6 Rubber, Plastic 3.53 2.16 1.99 -0.06
7 Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. 0.26 1.17 1.06 0.07
8 Basic Metal Industries 0.69 4.90 1.53 -0.14
9 Metal Products 0.49 1.03 1.14 0.06
10 Non-Electrical Machinery 1.31 3.74 2.85 -0.10
11 Electrical Machinery 2.28 2.32 9.14 -0.16
12 Transport Equipment 1.35 3.66 6.07 -0.15
13 Office, Precision instr. 3.36 6.67 6.51 -0.27
Note: see Table A.0.   Table A.2
Country correlations. Average correlation of growth rates of value added
within each country (1979-90)
BE DE DK ES FR GR IR IT NL PO UK AVERAGE
1 Food 0.24 0.42 0.10 0.40 0.19 0.33 0.34 0.10 0.04 0.28 0.62 0.28
2 Textiles, Apparel 0.12 0.50 0.37 0.51 0.07 0.26 0.30 0.30 0.29 0.10 0.67 0.32
3 Wood, Furniture 0.23 0.41 0.37 0.46 0.37 0.29 0.23 0.36 0.27 0.13 0.74 0.35
4 Paper, Printing 0.32 0.37 0.25 0.50 0.38 0.18 0.40 0.29 0.35 0.23 0.73 0.36
5 Chemicals 0.35 0.30 0.13 0.22 0.15 -0.44 0.27 0.17 0.11 0.20 0.73 0.20
6 Rubber, Plastic 0.27 0.36 0.23 0.47 0.28 0.27 0.22 -0.29 0.00 0.15 0.53 0.23
7 Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. 0.22 0.31 0.09 0.34 0.37 0.07 0.26 0.47 0.36 0.39 0.77 0.33
8 Basic Metal Industries 0.23 0.56 0.32 0.26 0.19 0.13 0.11 0.38 0.24 0.27 0.58 0.30
9 Metal Products 0.44 0.44 0.42 0.40 0.36 0.32 0.36 0.37 0.30 0.37 0.75 0.41
10 Non-Electrical Machinery 0.45 0.40 0.41 0.30 0.27 0.26 0.24 0.49 0.15 0.30 0.46 0.34
11 Electrical Machinery 0.43 0.45 0.31 0.30 0.39 0.39 0.18 0.34 0.01 -0.02 0.52 0.30
12 Transport Equipment 0.36 -0.08 0.05 0.25 0.23 0.18 0.31 0.47 0.01 0.27 0.66 0.25
13 Office, Precision instruments -0.02 0.21 0.29 0.11 -0.04 0.13 -0.07 0.23 0.22 -0.14 0.61 0.14
 AVERAGE 0.28 0.36 0.26 0.35 0.25 0.18 0.24 0.28 0.18 0.20 0.64 0.29
Notes: See text. Table A.3
 Industry correlations. Average correlation of growth rates of value added
within each industry (1979-90)
BE DE DK ES FR GR IR IT NL PO UK AVERAGE
1 Food -0.06 -0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.14 0.01 0.04 0.03 0.02 0.09 0.01 0.01
2 Textiles, Apparel -0.03 0.24 -0.02 0.17 -0.11 -0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.13 0.04 0.13 0.04
3 Wood, Furniture 0.36 0.42 -0.15 0.38 0.29 0.08 0.31 0.19 0.48 0.47 0.22 0.28
4 Paper, Printing 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.16 0.20 -0.10 0.32 0.36 0.36 0.00 0.37 0.18
5 Chemicals 0.19 0.21 -0.03 -0.12 0.12 -0.14 0.08 0.03 0.23 -0.09 0.08 0.05
6 Rubber, Plastic 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.18 0.11 0.11 -0.05 0.02 0.03 -0.07 0.17 0.06
7 Non-Metallic Mineral Prod. 0.32 0.44 0.01 0.23 0.47 0.41 0.28 0.52 0.47 0.08 0.28 0.32
8 Basic Metal Industries 0.36 0.29 0.28 0.08 0.27 0.36 0.15 0.24 0.36 -0.17 0.19 0.22
9 Metal Products 0.34 0.34 0.02 0.39 0.35 -0.14 0.28 0.22 0.25 0.15 0.20 0.22
10 Non-Electrical Machinery 0.31 0.40 0.24 0.26 0.23 -0.05 0.23 0.33 0.19 0.06 0.28 0.22
11 Electrical Machinery 0.33 0.12 0.20 0.10 0.38 0.03 0.22 0.23 -0.06 -0.10 0.18 0.15
12 Transport Equipment 0.02 -0.14 -0.18 0.12 0.22 0.02 0.08 0.13 0.15 0.16 0.19 0.07
13 Office, Precision instruments 0.18 0.11 0.38 0.39 0.40 -0.08 0.15 0.31 -0.12 0.23 0.26 0.20
   AVERAGE 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.18 0.24 0.04 0.16 0.20 0.19 0.06 0.20 0.16
Notes: See text.